Missing the Point: Violence Reduction and Policy Misadventures in Nairobi's Poor Neighbourhoods by Ruteere, Mutuma et al.
                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
 
MISSING THE POINT: VIOLENCE REDUCTION 
AND POLICY MISADVENTURES IN NAIROBI’S 
POOR NEIGHBOURHOODS 
 
Addressing and Mitigating Violence 
Mutuma Ruteere, Patrick Mutahi, Becky Mitchell and  
Jeremy Lind 
November 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MISSING THE POINT: VIOLENCE REDUCTION AND 
POLICY MISADVENTURES IN NAIROBI’S POOR 
NEIGHBOURHOODS 
Mutuma Ruteere, Patrick Mutahi, Becky Mitchell and Jeremy Lind 
November 2013 
 
This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are clearly 
credited. 
 
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in November 2013 
© Institute of Development Studies 
 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338). 
The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across six key 
themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant 
knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been 
developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.  
 
This development of this material has been led by the Institute of Development Studies 
and CHRIPS who jointly hold the copyright.  
 
The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views 
expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies. 
 
AG Level 2 Output ID: 55 
1 
 
Violence and vulnerability 
This report examines prevailing understandings of violence in Nairobi and how it is 
addressed, as well as the limitations of existing violence mitigation measures. 
Violence and crime are endemic in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods, where they 
enmesh with wider problems of vulnerability. Widespread poverty and lack of 
livelihood opportunities for a large proportion of the urban poor exacerbate their 
vulnerability to being victimised by non-state violent actors and sectors of the state 
implicated inciting and perpetrating violence and crime. The failure of the state to 
provide for basic needs in health, education and social care, as well as a lack of 
effective policing, has created an opening that criminal organisations and gangs have 
exploited. In poorer areas of Nairobi, they provide illegal connections to public utilities, 
mediate access to economic opportunities, and operate protection rackets. In some 
cases, these activities have been carried out with the knowledge and sometimes 
active involvement of the state. 
There is a close and growing association between violence and politics in Kenya, 
which is inflected with ethnic, regional and religious differences. Ethnicised political 
violence has existed in Kenya since the early 1990s and has become more 
widespread since. During the post-election violence that swept Kenya in 2007–8, 
Nairobi’s poorest areas were carved into enclaves where vigilante groups and criminal 
organisations associated with different ethnic groups patrolled ‘their’ areas, 
demanding to see identity cards, carrying out evictions and attacking the homes and 
retail premises of members of opposing ethnic groups. The failure of the state to 
provide effective policing in Nairobi’s poorer neighbourhoods has meant that control 
and enforcement of order have become the preserve of non-state violent actors, as 
well as other community mobilisation efforts, leading to new forms of insecurity for 
residents of these areas. What becomes ethnic violence or political violence often 
begins as criminal violence such as theft, burglary or murder. Vigilante responses can 
easily escalate into a more serious conflict with ethnic inflections if the alleged 
perpetrator of a crime is a member of a different ethnic group. 
Many non-state violent actors such as the Mungiki (a secretive sect and banned 
criminal organisation) oscillate between working as enforcers and mobilisers for 
politicians and operating as criminal outfits. While violence instigated by national 
political figures is certainly an important part of understanding the dynamics of 
Kenya’s contemporary violence, multiple levels of governance and politics need to be 
considered, with the role of community-level political entrepreneurs being especially 
crucial. 
Limits of law and order approach 
Prevailing responses to violence and crime in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods assume 
that there is a lack of law and order and that more robust policing and tougher laws 
can increase security. Violence-mitigation approaches have involved more robust 
policing measures such as raids and operations to round up low-level criminals, and 
increased use of ‘stop and search’ and of surveillance. Police raids are at times 
characterised by the indiscriminate use of excessive force, and sections of the police 
forces in Kenya are implicated in extra-judicial killings and assassinations, among 
other serious human rights violations. Other measures that have been tried include 
clearing hawkers from pavements in the city centre and cracking down on matatus 
(privately owned public service vehicles) that provide work for young people. These 
measures, however, have done nothing to reduce crime and violence and actually 
aggravate the underlying causes of insecurity. 
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The argument that increased policing will reduce violence and crime in poor 
neighbourhoods assumes that the police can act effectively. However, institutional 
weaknesses and incapacities as well as the corruption and alleged complicity of some 
police actors in criminal activity undermine public trust and confidence in the Kenya 
Police Service. Public opinion polling has found that a majority of Nairobians overall, 
and in poor neighbourhoods specifically, trust vigilante groups more than the police 
forces to respond to crime; they also favour a different type of policing involving 
greater coordination with community actors and groups. More robust policing 
measures are unlikely to succeed without fundamental reforms to existing policing 
institutions, an end to impunity for crimes and abuses committed by sections of the 
police, and reforms to make the formal justice system more accessible and responsive 
to the needs of the poor. 
Need for a wider approach 
The effectiveness of stronger policing measures is also limited because they do little 
to respond to a problem that has multiple drivers. While official responses to violence 
and crime in Nairobi have generally involved the temporary use of more robust 
policing measures, existing evidence on what causes violence and crime suggests 
that these measures are unlikely to be effective in reducing levels of violence and 
crime over the long term. A different approach is required to address more deeply 
rooted problems of poverty and unemployment, particularly among young people, and 
of the lack of basic services provided in poor neighbourhoods. Public opinion surveys 
also indicate that measures to address youth unemployment and improve the urban 
environment – through, for example, better street lighting and infrastructure – can 
make a positive difference in addressing violence and crime in poor neighbourhoods. 
In practice, there have been efforts such as the Safer Nairobi Initiative that aspire to a 
more coordinated effort to improve urban security by involving agencies and 
departments with mandates to deliver public services and create work opportunities. 
The initiative, which was endorsed by the Nairobi City Council in 2005, fell victim to a 
political tug-of-war between council officials and representatives of the Provincial 
Administration at the time. The initiative was also hamstrung by a lack of public 
confidence in the city council. Nonetheless, the spirit of such efforts to develop a 
joined-up multisectoral approach is needed to improve security for the urban poor. 
This report assesses a number of measures that could be incorporated in a wider 
strategy to address and mitigate violence. These include policies to extend economic 
opportunities and employment to young people: 
 The Kenya Youth Empowerment Project of the Kenya Private Sector 
Alliance (KEPSA) aims to build the capacity of youth through 
internships and training. Kazi kwa Vijana is a national public works 
programme that provides low-wage work for young people. However, 
these interventions are few in a context of widespread youth 
unemployment. Many interventions focus on entrepreneurship even 
though many young people have little interest in running their own 
business and lack the ability to do so. Public visibility of these 
interventions is also low and the agencies have not done enough to 
reach the potential beneficiaries. Further, lacking a national policy on 
youth employment, there have been few efforts to connect the 
multitude of state and non-state initiatives. 
 One positive measure was the decision by the Ministry of Finance to 
remove the import duty on motorcycles in 2008. This significantly 
reduced the cost of motorcycles, allowing many young people to 
3 
 
purchase them for starting a taxi business. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some young people who were previously involved in 
crime ceased to be so when they entered the motorcycle transport 
business and, thus, the measure helped to reduce crime. 
Other measures to improve service delivery help to address some of the factors that 
make the poor vulnerable to violence: 
 The construction of ‘bio-centres’ (sanitation facilities) by the Umande 
Trust in Kibera and Korogocho areas of Nairobi. In Huruma, the group 
Getto Green, led by young people, initiated a number of income-
generating activities for its members, some of whom were previously 
involved in crime. The Adopt A Light Company has erected light masts 
in slums, which some slum residents believe has helped to reduce 
crime. 
 The Water Services Trust Fund and the Water Services Board under 
the Ministry of Water and Irrigation has established water kiosks in 
some poor neighbourhoods, which are operated by licensed water 
vendors. The opening times of the water kiosks are regulated as are 
the tariffs, which must be displayed. The water kiosks have greatly 
reduced the distance travelled to fetch water, especially by women, 
thus increasing their security in areas that are prone to violent crime. 
Priorities for action 
This study proposes the following priorities to address and mitigate the impacts of 
violence on the poor in Nairobi: 
 Formulation of a policy framework to promote multisectoral and 
cross-agency inputs to address and mitigate violence and crime. 
In spite of the shortcomings of the Safer Nairobi Initiative, a policy 
framework is required to promote coordination and coherence of inputs 
across sectors and multiple levels of governance. The current context 
in which devolved structures of governance are being implemented 
under the new constitution provides an opportunity to formulate such a 
framework. Under the constitution, security remains the mandate of the 
central government but the delivery of most services is now the 
responsibility of county governments, with the role of central 
government limited to policy formulation and coordination in areas such 
as the provision of water and health. 
 Incorporating analysis of politics and violence into assessment of 
policies and measures to strengthen youth employment and basic 
services in poor neighbourhoods. Although it is well known that a 
wider approach is required to address and mitigate violence in Nairobi’s 
poor neighbourhoods, there is no systematic effort to assess how 
initiatives to address youth unemployment or improve the delivery of 
basic services affect the vulnerability of the poor to violence and crime. 
Thus, policy stakeholders have little insight into what works, in which 
circumstances and how. Monitoring and evaluation of efforts to improve 
youth employment and basic services in poor neighbourhoods should 
assess how they intersect with politics and violence. Doing so will 
strengthen the evidence base of what measures can make a difference 
and how. 
 Learning from existing community efforts to address and mitigate 
violence. Responses to violence are rarely informed by community-
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level knowledge and expertise on what is likely to work. While there 
have been many local-level efforts to address violence in Nairobi’s poor 
urban neighbourhoods, many of these are undocumented and not 
known beyond the neighbourhoods where they are implemented. They 
therefore remain largely invisible. Yet, it is important to identify, monitor 
and learn from how local initiatives seek to address violence, with what 
consequences and for whom. 
 Further rigorous empirical analysis of the setting and 
circumstances of violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods. 
There is a lack of detailed, disaggregated data and evidence to do a 
forensic analysis of the causes of violence that could be used to craft 
more effective policy, legal, policing and development measures. Given 
that much of the violence in poor neighbourhoods is carried out by 
criminal organisations and often linked to complex local-level political 
struggles, the nuances and complexities of political dynamics at this 
level are often difficult to see and understand. Thus, new empirical data 
are required, drawing on intimate local knowledge. 
 
